This paper attempts to confirm the life-cycle relationship that lower subjective survival probabilities should lead to less positively sloped consumption trajectories. I use the results of six waves of subjective survival probability questions in the HRS to construct an index of survival belief that exploits the panel nature of the data by summarizing all of a respondent's answers to such questions. In conjunction with constructed consumption values from the financial section of the HRS, I test the life-cycle relationship using OLS and Least-Absolute Deviation regression. I find weak evidence that the life-cycle effect of subjective survival probability is significant in a high-cognitive-ability sub-sample of the HRS.
I. Introduction
People's beliefs about their own life-expectancy have not been extensively studiedmainly due to lack of data. It is not clear that people actually have consistent beliefs about their future chances of survival at any time. Even if they do, measuring them in a meaningful and convincing way is difficult. The Health and Retirement Study has been attempting to obtain such measurements since 1992. In each wave of the survey,
respondents are asked what they think the probability is that they will live to be a specific age. Since these questions began being asked in 1992 several studies have examined the question of to what degree respondent's stated probabilities of survival relate to actual survival-this is a question of how informed respondents are about themselves and about human life expectancy. Few studies exist which examine to what extent these subjective survival probabilities affect respondents' decision-making-specifically their financial decision-making-as an economist might predict they would. That is the question under examination.
The life-cycle hypothesis makes a simple prediction about the relationship between a person's perceived survival probability and their consumption: those who think they are more likely to survive will have less consumption growth over time. Simply put, if you expect to live a long time, you will conserve your resources early in life in order to have enough later-this means earlier consumption will be lower than it would have been if you had thought your chances of survival were worse, ceteris paribus. In this way, a higher expected chance of survival should have the same effect as a higher interest rate or a lower degree of impatience.
Most attempts to confirm this relationship in the past have been confounded by lack of data on people's perceived risk of death. Typically, these tests have been based on proxies of life-expectation such as parents' ages of death or life-tables. Testing this implication using life-table mortality rates, Kuehlwein (1993) finds only mixed support for this relationship. Hamermesh (1984) finds some evidence that those who should expect to live longer retire later and consume less. He bases his inference about individuals' expected risk of death on both life-tables and the longevity of individuals' parents. Both of these studies are vulnerable to the criticism that their proxies for individual expectations may not reflect actual individual expectations. This study's main contribution is to examine a similar question using data that may better represent people's actual survival beliefs because it is obtained directly from them.
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) has elicited subjective life-expectation data from its respondents since the study's inception in 1992 (12 waves of the HRS have been completed-1992-2002 , every two years). The questions are of the form "What is the percent chance that you will live to be 75 or more?" (the target age-75 in this case-can vary). Several papers have examined the responses to these questions, and a few broad facts have been established about them: their mean values over respondents are generally close to life-table data; they contain information about respondents' likelihood of dying that the extensive health survey within the study does not capture; respondents' answers to these questions co-vary reasonably with lifestyle indicators of mortality, such as smoking; and these answers appear to be updated as new health information arises between waves of the HRS. However, the responses vary more than life-table data and a large proportion of respondents answer zero, 50 or 100 percent (Hurd, McGarry 1995 , 2002 .
That these responses broadly agree with life-table statistics, show evidence of updating, and reflect lifestyle choice suggests that respondents answer the questions honestly and take them seriously. That the variance is larger than it would be if respondents took their response from a life-table suggests error in measurement of expectations or that some people are optimistic or pessimistic about their expected longevity as compared to a lifetable. The existence of so many answers at zero, 50 and 100 also suggests measurement error or significant rounding, or that respondents have a high degree of uncertainty about the risk of death. Nevertheless, many of the responses seem quite rational and therefore it makes sense to use them, along with other HRS data to test whether respondents' answers affect their financial decision-making. In particular, because some of the subjective survival responses seem sensible and others not, and because the HRS contains other data that indicate mental, it makes sense to test whether there is a subset of respondents for whom the life-expectation data is sensible and who use those expectations to inform their financial decision-making as the life-cycle hypothesis predicts. This follows Hamermesh (1984) again, as he used data from the Terman Study of Gifted Individuals in the hope that if anyone would have the capacity to make decisions using a life-cycle framework, it would be those people who have larger mental capacity.
This study will be a joint examination of three separate questions: how well the lifecycle hypothesis predicts consumption behavior; to what degree HRS respondents (or people in general) take seriously the question of predicting their own survival; and to what degree people's actual beliefs about their mortality risk (whether captured by the survey or not) influence their financial decisions. My main emphasis is on the latter two questions; my life-cycle model will be relatively basic. This point is relevant because the biggest shortcoming of this study will be the lack of direct consumption data from the HRS respondents. If the main goal of this paper were to test the life-cycle implication independent of using the HRS data, then a better research design would probably be to use a survey with a consistent measure of consumption, and then to use a reasonable proxy for survival belief-as in the Kuehlwein and Hamermesh papers mentioned above.
I tolerate the lack of consumption data and the problems it introduces because the main goal here is to see whether there is a substantial effect on consumption from people's actual beliefs about their survival probability-not a presumed belief
In order to test the implication that consumption profiles have a more positive slope for respondents who expect to live longer I use the data in the HRS to construct two sets of variables for each respondent. First, I use data on assets, income and capital gains to deduce a value of consumption for each respondent for each time-period between survey interviews. This is problematic, as it introduces substantial measurement error. Second, I use all responses that a respondent has given to any of the subjective survival probability questions over the 12 waves of the study to calculate a linear survival probability profile for each respondent who has answered at least three such questions during the study. This profile is meant to represent the set of survival expectations that both reflects the responses given and is smooth and linear. I then test the hypothesis using ordinary least-squares regression and least-absolute deviation regression. I find only weak evidence that the relationship exists in the data. This may be due to the measurement error introduced in the process of calculating consumption, or it may be that the relationship actually does not describe respondents' behavior.
In Section One I describe the theory that underlies the life-cycle prediction I test. Section Two contains a description of the data and a description of the calculations used to produce values of consumption and of expected survival probabilities. In section three I test the life-cycle implication that consumption profiles will be more positively sloped for those who have greater subjective survival probabilities.
II. Life-cycle Theory
I use a simplified life-cycle model to produce the implication that I test. The implication that consumption growth should rise with a rise in a person's mortality risk comes directly from the Euler equation of an agent maximizing the sum of additively separable utility over his lifetime (my formulation is borrowed from Kuehlwein):
Here, p is probability of surviving to the next period, r is the interest rate and δ is the rate of time-preference. Lowering p has the same effect as raising δ or lowering r-it privileges current consumption over future consumption.
This formulation elides the issue of the utility value of a bequest upon dying. In this study I ignore the possible effects of such a value. To what degree people actually behave based on a desire to leave a bequest is an open question that will not be addressed here.
I assume a felicity function ( )
(constant relative risk aversion with relative risk aversion parameter 1-γ ), and take the logarithm of each side of (1). Also, because my concern is with life-span uncertainty, I assume that the income stream is known. This means that there is no uncertainty about realized consumption in period t+1, given that the respondent survives to that period, so I dispense with the expectation operator:
The subscript i has been added to indicate variables that vary across respondents.
Adding a term, u, to account for measurement error in the change in log-consumption gives:
As written, this equation should apply only to a single agent making decisions for himself. Analyzing a similar case for a multi-person household in which agents care for each other's well-being requires further assumptions about how those agents interact and make decisions together. For the sake of this analysis I need every data point I can get, so I show results both for singles and for all households. When I analyze a household, I
will assume that the household bases its decisions on the well-being of the member who has the highest next-period subjective survival probability. To do this I will use the maximum value of p among the people in the household. This assumed decision structure could certainly be replaced with a different one, but this is relatively straightforward and gives the analysis substantially more power as it increases the amount of available data by a factor of four.
The only variables from (3) that I have measured variation in are consumption and subjective survival expectation. One possibility to get variation in the interest rate is to segregate respondents by income-tax bracket thereby dividing people into groups based on after-tax interest rate. I do not do this because it seems unlikely that most respondents are actually that sensitive to what their marginal tax rate is or to what the boundaries between tax brackets are. Therefore, I make the possibly unfounded assumptions that the difference between log r it and log i δ is distributed randomly in the population given log(p it ), and that i γ is constant (or distributed randomly) throughout the population. This leaves the relationship that I examine: 
III. Data
The HRS is a nationally representative panel study of persons over 50 in the United and 85 respectively 1 . These statistics are meant simply to make it clear what the population of respondents is like in any particular year. They cannot be used to make accurate inferences about the evolution of households or singles in the HRS population over time because those respondents who have a valid answer to at least one subjective survival question are a highly non-random group. This is due to both self-selection (it takes a certain mental capacity to give a sensible answer to a probability question) and due to survey variation (exactly which sets of respondents have been asked which questions has varied over time in the HRS).
Predictably, the single population has significantly lower assets and income than the overall population. Also, the single population has a higher proportion of females due to women having longer life-spans than men. Finally, the single population generally has a slightly lower subjective survival probability-which could simply reflect the strong relationship between subjective survival probability and wealth that has been noted elsewhere (Hurd, McGarry 1995) .
Measuring Consumption
Each wave of the HRS contains detailed questions on household assets (both real and financial), household income (separate from capital gains), and capital gains. The survey does not contain any consistent measure of household consumption. In order to test the implication of survival expectations on consumption profiles, I use the HRS data on assets, income and capital gains to infer a measure of consumption for each respondent for each period between survey interviews.
The basis of the calculation is the relationship:
That is, consumption between two measured points in time equals whatever the household took in-in earned income and capital gains-minus the amount that their asset level grew during that period. It is ambiguous in the HRS whether respondents give pre-tax or post-tax income levels and so there is no way to account for income tax. I do, however subtract property taxes from inferred consumption.
First, I use the HRS income data to estimate household income over the period between survey interviews. I divide the study's constructed household income variable-which estimates total household income in the one-year period prior to the interview-by twelve to get an estimated monthly income and then multiply by the number of months between interviews. This procedure will add measurement error to the extent that actual household income during the period between interviews differs from income during the period just prior to the interview. Additionally, all financial variables in the HRS include imputed values which increase the level of measurement error, but also substantially increase the number of data points available. To exclude the imputed values from this analysis would entail dropping a majority of the available data since almost all respondents require imputation on at least one financial variable.
Second, I use the capital gains section of the survey to estimate capital gains between survey interviews. Respondents are asked whether they have put money in to or taken money out of their various assets. This information, combined with the asset values reported in the earlier and later waves, allows for inference of the respondent's capital gains over the period. This is straightforward except that housing capital gains are not well-measured for respondents who buy or sell a house during the period, so those respondents are dropped.
Finally, I calculate respondents' change in assets between the survey interviews by subtracting the later survey-interview household assets variable from the earlier surveyinterview household assets variable. I do not include housing assets on the assumption that people-particularly retired people-do not generally monetize housing assets for the sake of consumption. This assumption is probably alright for the period 1992-2002, but may be less true now as mortgage refinancing for consumption seems to have become much more common.
Adding income and capital gains and subtracting asset growth and property taxes, and then deflating by the CPI-U yields the measure of consumption in 2002 dollars that is used to test the life-cycle prediction.
Using this strategy I have measures of consumption for the periods between the survey waves 1992 and 1994, 1994 and 1996, 1996 and 1998, 1998 and 2000, and 2000 and 2002 . These five sets of consumption data can be used to calculate four cross-sections of log-consumption growth, the statistic of interest in the Euler equation. One final reason to believe that there is a large amount of measurement error in the measure of consumption is the result of a separate study (Perry, 2005 , available by request) in which I fit the covariance structure of log-consumption growth to three possible models of the consumption time-series using the generalized method of Table 3 shows that despite its weaknesses, my inference about household consumption do match up to a substantial degree with the limited information the HRS survey provides about actual household consumption.
Measuring Subjective Survival Expectations
In Table 4 shows statistics of attributes of people who gave certain answers to P(85) in each year of the survey. Panel A shows the differences between all respondents and those who gave an answer of 50 or more and those who answered less than 50. Those who give lower answers are more likely to be male-a fact that squares well with actual mortality data. Additionally, those who give lower answers have less education, fewer assets and less income than those who gave higher answers.
Panel B shows the same statistics for those who gave answers of exactly zero, 50 and 100. Because such a high proportion of respondents give these answers and because in the case of zero and 100, they are not very sensible answers, it is worth checking whether there is something noticeably different about these respondents. In contrast to the result from panel A, those who answer 100 have less education, fewer assets and less income than those who answer 50. Those who answered zero have less still. Those who answered 50 look essentially the same as the rest of the population. This suggests that answers of zero and 100 may be more a sign of poor understanding of the question than of optimism or pessimism. This conclusion will be used in developing a measure of expected next-period survival probability.
A response to one of these questions does not imply directly any particular value of the respondent's expected chance of living to any particular date other than the target age. In order to use the survey responses to calculate a value of p (in the life-cycle model the probability of living to the next period; in this analysis the probability of living through the next period of measured consumption) for each respondent, some assumptions are necessary.
For each respondent, I assume that a response to the question "What is the percent chance that you will live to be 75 or more?" implies a belief over all the conditional probabilities of surviving one year into the future (that is, for example, the probability of surviving to age 63 given that the respondent has survived to age 62) for each year from the respondent's current age up to the age of 75. Assuming that these probabilities exist, the response to the question is just the product of all conditional probabilities from the respondent's age to the target age:
Here, R is the survey response, A is the age of the respondent, T is the target age and i ρ is the probability of surviving to age i, given that the respondent has survived to age i- 
where m is the amount by which survival probabilities decrease each year and H=T-A.
Taking logs of both sides gives 
( 1)( ) ln 2
where equation (12) 
separately for each respondent, thereby giving values of r and m for each respondent who has answered at least three subjective survival questions. In this formulation, r is the respondent's perceived risk of death in the first year (the first year is set to 1992 for all respondents since that is the first year of survey data for any respondents), and, again, m is the yearly increase in risk of death. Using these numbers, I calculate a respondent's perceived risk of death in year x as risk x =r+(x-1992)m, or equivalently, I calculate their perceived probability of survival during year x as p x =1-risk x .
The above explanation ignores the issue that when a respondent answers zero, it is impossible to take a log and use that response in the calculation. I try two strategies to deal with this issue and test which seems to work better. First, I exclude all responses of zero from the calculations. Above, we established that those who answer 100 seem to be similar to those who answer zero, and additionally, they seem to be the same sort of unlikely answer to a probability question-perhaps due to misunderstanding. For that reason, when I exclude the zeros I also exclude the 100s. For the second strategy, instead of excluding the zeros and 100s, I replace the zeroes with the value 0.00001, which can be logged, and I replace the 100s (really 1s since everything is converted to fractions) with 0.99999.
In each case, I use the values of r and m generated for each respondent to calculate the respondent's perceived probability of survival during any year. These predicted yearly subjective survival values can be multiplied together as in (8) Table 4 . Strategy 1 drops responses of zero or 100, strategy 2 replaces them.
The first two sets of R 2 values are for regressions over the same responses. The last set is for strategy 2 used to predict for all responses for which it is possible to do so. The number of possible cases using strategy 2 is larger because dropping responses in strategy 1 necessarily means reducing some respondents to below the three-response level necessary for prediction. Strategy 1 produces a better set of predicted responses in all cases. This could be because answers of zero or 100 are more likely to reflect confusion than information about held beliefs.
Perhaps needless to say, I do not hypothesize that any respondent has set beliefs about his or her conditional probability of surviving during any particular year. It would be claiming too much to say that the HRS questions evoke anything more than a general impression of survival probability from most respondents (the exception perhaps being any professional actuaries surveyed). The scheme I propose for integrating all of a respondent's answers is intended to be a fairly straightforward way of approximating what a respondent's well-articulated beliefs might look like if they were forced to develop them in a rigorous way and if they had some consistency over time. Therefore, the charge could be leveled that I have invented an index with a dubious epistemic nature.
My only response is that I see no other simple strategy for incorporating all of a respondent's answers that is not at least as questionable. It may well be that questions like those on the HRS are simply not sophisticated enough to use in testing life-cycle models.
IV. Results
To test whether the life-cycle prediction holds I first check to see whether it holds in a coarse or general way before I attempt to estimate a precise effect. As noted above, six waves of HRS data yield five periods of consumption data, which in turn can be used to produce four data points per respondent of log-consumption growth. I calculate predicted subjective survival beliefs for each respondent corresponding to their belief that they will survive from the time of the HRS interview all the way through the next period of calculated consumption. For example, I have consumption measured for the periods 1992-1994 and 1994-1996 . This allows me to calculate log-consumption growth for the period 1992/1994-1994/1996 . Then, the relevant survival belief to juxtapose with logconsumption growth from 1992/1994-1994/1996 is the respondent's belief that they will live from the survey interview date in 1994 all the way through their next period of measured consumption-which I assume to be the end of 1996. Therefore I calculate the respondent's subjective belief that he or she will survive through the years 1995 and 1996. I do this calculation for each respondent, for each measurement of logconsumption growth. I then aggregate the four cross-sections of log-consumption growth data and subjective survival probability data into one dataset.
Figures 2 and 3 shows a scatter plot of the basic data: log-consumption growth vs. logsubjective survival belief for households and for singles. There is no clear relationship, but the existence of some very low subjective survival beliefs distorts the abscissa. Again, there is no clear relationship between the sets of points.
Figures 6 through 9 clarify the relationship somewhat by plotting the mean logconsumption growth for each decile of log-survival belief (the higher deciles indicate a higher subjective survival probability). In figures 6 and 7 there does appear to be a noisy, but positive relationship between the variables as the Euler equation predicts. However, figures 8 and 9-in which the same data is graphed, but including bars showing one standard deviation on each side of the mean-show that the log-consumption growth data has so much random variation in it that we cannot have any confidence in the relationship that figures 6 and 7 show.
Regressions of log-consumption growth on log p show similar results: the sign of the relationship is correct, but the significance is too low to have any confidence in the result. Table 6 shows the results of OLS regressions of log-consumption growth on log p for the entire sample. The first line of table 6 shows the results when the only independent variable is log p. The second line includes log p, years of education, an indicator for white race, and the decile of asset level of the household as regressors (using asset deciles instead of asset levels gives very similar results and gives the coefficient much more convenient values for reporting). In both of the first two lines, the sign on log p's coefficient is positive, but not significant at standard significance levels.
The next two lines show results of the same regressions for a sub-sample selected based on cognitive ability. The HRS includes a sequence in which respondents are read a list of 20 words and asked to recall as many as possible. Then, a few minutes later, they are again asked to recall as many as possible. The HRS also includes a set of questions in which the respondent is asked "what is 100 minus seven?", "and seven from that?", etc.
With the question repeated three more times. I have taken the total number of words a respondent remembered after being asked each time and the total number of correct answers they gave to the "serial 7s" questions to produce a word recall score and a serial 7s score. In addition, we know the level of education for the respondents. I select a subsample of respondents who are above the median on all three cognitive ability measures.
The reasoning behind this is that the life-cycle hypothesis applies to rational agents maximizing lifetime utility. Presumably, it takes a good deal of cognitive sophistication to do this; so perhaps the life-cycle result that we are testing holds for those who are more capable mentally. The results of the OLS regressions do not bear out this hypothesis.
Again, the coefficients on log p are positive, but not significant.
In the second half of the table I perform the same regressions using least-absolutedeviation (or median) regression instead of least-squares. I do this to minimize the impact of outliers-specifically outliers that may be the result of measurement error due to the calculations I used to produce values for consumption and for log p. The results for the entire sample are in the first two lines of the second half of table 6. Here, again, I
use log p alone as a regressor, and then log p along with education, race and asset level (in deciles). The results for log p are similar to the OLS regressions: the coefficient on log p is positive but insignificant.
The results for median-regression restricted to the high-cognitive-ability sample-the last two lines of table 6-have positive and significant coefficients on log p with t-statistics of 2.06 and 2.31 for the unconditional and conditional cases, respectively. I interpret this as weak evidence for the life-cycle hypothesis-weak because it only shows up in these rather esoteric specifications.
One other aspect of the results to note is that the coefficients on log p are considerably larger for the high-cognitive ability sub-sample than for the whole sample in all The second possibility (which I consider at least as likely), also conditional on some lifecycle behavior actually existing in the population, is that with random measurement error in log p, the coefficient on log p will be biased towards zero in a standard regression. It could very well be that the cognitively-able portion of the population is better able to produce a survey response that reflects their actual subjective beliefs. This would mean less measurement error in the calculated values of p, and therefore coefficients with greater absolute value. If this were the case, then the coefficient values for the highcognitive ability group might better reflect the true parameter values in the population. shortcoming in the study of subjective survival beliefs on financial decision-making is the lack of joint data on survival beliefs and consumption. Each new wave of the HRS will add significant power to this study, though. As this is being written, the 2004 wave of HRS data is forthcoming in the next six months, which should allow for a better understanding of whether a real relationship exists between subjective survival beliefs and consumption trajectories.
V. Conclusions
In this paper, I have examined constructed consumption and subjective survival probability data to test whether those respondents who believe they are more likely to survive have higher growth in consumption. My constructed subjective survival probability data uses a novel process to integrate all subjective survival responses for any given respondent into one survival curve. These curves alone can explain a large amount of the variation in subjective survival response and they allow for use in predicting subjective survival probability over short periods-which is necessary for estimating lifecycle effects.
My constructed consumption data contains a large amount of measurement error. This makes finding any life-cycle effects difficult. I find weak evidence that such a relationship exists in the data for those respondents who are of higher cognitive ability. I also find some evidence that high-cognitive-ability respondents either have a different group mean of relative risk aversion than the general HRS population or that they are better at articulating their subjective survival beliefs. 
